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THE UNINTENDED REVOLUTION IN PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW
Richard A. Epstein*
There is an ever greater recognition today that tort law writ large
is a form of government regulation, best understood as part of some
overall system of social control. Tort sanctions and criminal fines are
often substitutes for each other, and public prohibitions and com-
mands are substitutes for private injunctions. Everything, in a sense,
is regarded as connected to everything else. Our watchword calls for
a comprehensive evaluation of tort law, which thus enlarges and com-
plicates the task of legal reform.
The proposition that the tort law operates as an integral part of a
larger system has not been lost on common law judges, who, on some
occasions at least, have been reluctant to impose important structural
changes on the legal system by conscious judicial choice. Judge Mil-
dred Lilly, writing a generation ago in the justly celebrated case of
Hammontree v. Jenner,' illustrates the cautious attitude. She had
been asked to overturn the settled common law rule that excused a
defendant for harms inflicted on strangers when the defendant had
been overtaken by a sudden and unanticipated epileptic seizure while
driving his car. Although she noted the "logic" of plaintiff's position,
Judge Lilly refused to upset the jury verdict in favor of the defendant
by breaking new legal ground:
Appellants seek to have this court override the established law of
this state which is dispositive of the issue before us as outmoded in
today's social and economic structure, particularly in the light of
the now recognized principles imposing liability upon the manufac-
turer, retailer and all distributive and vending elements and activi-
* James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This paper has been
prepared for the Liberty Fund/Manhattan Institute Conference on Product Liability Law,
held in Charleston, South Carolina on February 12-13, 1988.
A different version of this paper (with a discussion of the European Community Directive
on Product Liability) was presented at a Conference on Product Liability held at Tel-Aviv
University, and will appear in the Tel-Aviv University Studies in Law. I would also like to
thank William Landes and Richard Posner for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1971). The case has some currency today
because it is featured prominently in at least two casebooks on the subject. Thus it is the first
case in M. Franklin & R. Rabin, Tort Law and Alternatives-Cases and Materials 3 (4th ed.
1987), and R. Epstein, C. Gregory, and H. Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials in the Law of
Torts 115 (4th ed. 1984). The title of the Franklin and Rabin casebook makes the point of the
first paragraph of this article.
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ties which bring a product to the consumer to his injury.2
Judge Lilly then cited to Justice Traynor's classic concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. ,3 and noted that "it is not
enough to simply say, as do appellants, that insurance carriers should
be the ones to bear the cost of injuries to innocent victims on a strict
liability basis." 4 She then advanced her clinching argument against
judicial innovation:
To invoke a rule of strict liability on users of the streets and high-
ways, however, without also establishing in substantial detail how
the new rule should operate would only contribute confusion to the
automobile accident problem. Settlement and claims adjustment
procedures would become chaotic until the new rules were worked
out on a case-by-case basis, and the hardships of delayed compen-
sation would be seriously intensified. Only the Legislature, if it
deems it wise to do so, can avoid such difficulties by enacting a
comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident
victims in place of or in addition to the law of negligence.5
Read a generation later, this passage contains an enormous
amount of irony. Hammontree raised an issue of great intellectual
curiosity-has the defendant afflicted with seizure done any act or
any wrong? By the same token, it is an issue of small practical impor-
tance. The percentage of automobile accidents caused by seizures,
heart attacks, and the like is tiny, not only in absolute terms, but also
in comparison to those caused by teenagers on the highway.6 Any
suggestion that the plaintiff's requested simplification of the law
might either delay compensation or induce administrative confusion
is quite off the mark. Removing the mental disability questions from
the tort law would only serve to speed up the disposition of cases,
enhance the recovery of injured plaintiffs, reduce the administrative
costs of insurance companies, and bring the system back into line with
the general practices of automobile insurance companies in disposing
of routine claims. 7 One can easily see why the introduction of an au-
2 Hammontree, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 531, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
3 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)..
4 Hammontree, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
5 Id. at 532-33, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (quoting Maloney v.- Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 453, 445
P.2d 513, 515, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 899 (1968).
6 The law is far clearer that there is no reduced standard of care for infants, at least in so
far as they engage in driving, and probably in other activities licensed by the state as well. See,
e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966); Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452,
107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
7 In [insurance adjusters'] day-to-day work, the concern with liability is reduced to
the question of whether either or both parties violated the rules of the road as
expressed in common traffic laws. Taking the doctrine of negligence per se to an
extreme doubtless unforeseen by the makers of the formal law, adjusters tend to
[Vol. 10:21932194
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tomobile no-fault plan would require explicit legislation, but the strict
liability rule for automobile accidents requested by the plaintiff clearly
falls within the class of incremental, and in this instance, welcome
common law changes.
But what about product liability law, which has been fashioned
by judicial innovation? Here there are surely antecedent references to
modern doctrines. As Professor Gary Schwartz has pointed out,
strict liability has been around for a long time, there were early excep-
tions to the privity doctrine, individual plaintiffs have succeeded in
many watershed cases, and the early commentators often took a
favorable view toward expanded product liability.8 Nonetheless, the
proof of the pudding here is in the eating. The question is not
whether there are doctrinal hints of future legal changes. The ulti-
mate impact of doctrine is measured by its influence on the frequency
and severity of product liability actions, which have been massive, no
matter the system of accounting. 9 The precise doctrinal levers may be
hard to identify and evaluate. But the increase in liability for defec-
tive products has been substantial, and it has been almost entirely the
creature of judicial action. Yet there has been no considered legisla-
tive evaluation of these doctrinal changes, or of their influence on the
innovation, distribution, and pricing of the many different kinds of
products that are (or at least should be) brought to market. Quite the
opposite, the general view today is probably that judicial decisions in
product liability cases have made marginal improvements, and that
legislation could only upset the delicate balance that courts have
achieved. Thus, Dean Harvey Perlman has written recently:
[T]he incidents of uncertainty have been substantially reduced as
the courts have used the traditional trial and error method of the
common law to fashion a cohesive body of doctrine. The most a
legislature could do now is to codify our current understanding in
its incomplete form and thus prevent further fine tuning.10
define a claim as one of liability or of no liability depending only on whether a rule
was violated, regardless of the intention, knowledge, necessity, and other such
qualifications that might receive sympathetic attention even from a traffic court
judge.
H.L. Ross, Settled Out of Court-The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment 98
(1970).
8 Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 796, 797-811 (1983).
9 "The number of product liability cases filed in federal district courts has increased from
1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758 percent increase." The Product Liability Reform Act,
S. Rep. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 422].
10 Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 503, 505 (1987). The early cases in the area typically refused to regard the expansion of
tort liability as a legislative function, as in the "crashworthiness" or "second collision cases."
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The juxtaposition of these two attitudes is quite remarkable. To-
day legislative action is thought necessary for minor changes in the
law governing automobiles, but largely inappropriate for the funda-
mental rules of product liability. At the very least, we have lost any
real sense of the appropriate distribution of power between courts and
legislatures. In part, this article examines the relationship between
judicial and legislative change in the product liability area in three
separate ways. The first section details the shift from traditional to
modern product liability law. That shift is highlighted by two sepa-
rate developments. The first is the rejection of freedom of contract for
judicial regulation in the product liability area, and the second is the
change in the definition of product defects and the affirmative de-
fenses that have been developed under the new judicial orientation.
Notwithstanding the protestation of judges and commentators, this
common law reform has not been incremental, but revolutionary.
The second section traces the allocative and distributional conse-
quences of the transformation in product liability law as it applies to
both old and new products. The third section then uses the conclu-
sions developed in the first section to explain why legislative reform of
product liability law is so difficult to design conceptually and hints at
some of the political obstacles to the enactment of any product liabil-
ity reform legislation. The present rules of product liability law are
both inefficient and unwelcome, but by the same token, they are also
resistant to legislative or judicial modification, at least in the short
run, and probably in the long run.
I. CHANGES IN DOCTRINE: HIGH STAKES POKER
A. A Judicial Revolution
As noted above, the common law transformation of product lia-
bility law has not been preceded or accompanied by any detailed ex-
amination of either its distributive or allocative consequences. All the
major changes were introduced by common law decisions, without
any empirical studies as to their consequences, and even without any
armchair speculation as to their probable effects. Ironically, if the sit-
uation had been otherwise, the changes we have witnessed could
never have come about. It is quite one thing for the exponent of Criti-
cal Legal Studies or the champion of state socialism to announce that
See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). Note that in this instance, the
legislature itself appears to have concurred. See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982) which provides:
"Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."
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HeinOnline  -- 10 Cardozo L. Rev.  2196 1988-1989
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
the existing system of liability is woefully inadequate and that more
must be done to shepherd wayward plaintiffs into court."I Such radi-
cal innovation would strike cautious judges and experienced practi-
tioners as lying outside the proper judicial role. The frontal assault
would be regarded not only as a criticism of the tort system, but also
as an attack on the very fundamental institutions of the American
political order-which, in a sense, it is. 12 Cynicism will not work.
The radical transformation of product liability law has been regarded
as incremental reform-reform that enjoyed the support of the re-
spectable portions of the legal community.' 3 Whatever its effects, its
intention had been to improve the common law by gradual evolution.
On the surface, the development of product liability law followed the
model of common law adjudication that Edward Levi celebrated in
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning."' Small anomalies in doctrine
can be ironed out; ancient principles, such as strict liability, can be
imported from one area into another; artificial barriers to recovery,
such as privity and notice requirements, can be removed in order to
insure that the traditional objectives of justice and fair play are
respected in product liability cases as in other substantive legal areas.
The defenders of the current system of product liability law stress its
continuity with past doctrines. Like Professor Schwartz, they do not
see any radical changes in the way in which liability is formed. "The
common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of
society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly
'' See Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 443 (1987).
12 There is a parallel in constitutional law that is worth mentioning here. The most radical
departures from prior doctrine are found in such critical cases as West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law for women only) and National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Rela-
tions Act as regulation of interstate commerce and thus subject to federal regulation). These
opinions were written by Chief Justice Hughes, who counted among his credentials being a
Republican Governor of New York, a Republican presidential candidate, President of the
American Bar Association, and an all-round establishment figure. He had been twice ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court, first by Taft and then by Hoover. His decisions could legiti-
mate the changes in a way that no liberal judge could have brought about.
13 Thus, Senator Hollings expressed the minority view with regard to The Product Liabil-
ity Reform Act: "The Product Liability Reform Act is unwise Federal Legislation. It would
preempt 200 years of common law development in the State courts and legislatures without
sound statistical data or evidence to support a crisis in product liability." S. Rep. No. 422,
supra note 9, at 104.
Note that demands for empirical and statistical validation are imposed on Congress, but
not on the state law courts, whose changes are portrayed as having taken place-incre-
mentally-for 200 years.
14 E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 7-19 (1949). The model of common law
adjudication is also examined in B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921). Note
that Schwartz refers to the Levi book as a model of common law incrementalism. Schwartz,
supra note 8, at 796-98.
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meet the emerging and developing needs of our time,"' 5 is how one
federal circuit court described its role.
Professor John Wade, whose risk/utility formulas, in my view,1 6
have injected massive and unwanted uncertainty into product liability
law, has always seen himself as a responsible establishment figure and
never as the restless outsider. Yet his own proposals in product liabil-
ity law have had consequences that he never appreciated or desired.
His article, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products 17 was
written with an eye toward making sense out of the elusive distinction
between negligence and strict liability. In it, Wade proposed that the
way to understand the then prevailing consumer-expectation test of
liability was "to assume that the defendant knew of the dangerous
condition of the product and ask whether he was then negligent in
putting it on the market or supplying it to someone else."'" This test
works an enormous shift in the scope of product liability law because
it suggests that a defendant is liable for the failure to know what no
one else in the world knew or could have known, or, arguably, for the
failure to incorporate a set of design improvements that were not
available technically or economically at the time the product was de-
veloped. It was clear that Wade's formulation influenced courts in
such cases as Beshada v. Johns-Manville Product Corporation, 9 which
stated that knowledge at the time of trial, not of manufacture, was
relevant in assessing product risk in asbestos cases. The rule that
Wade proposes works reasonably well with construction defects. But
in design and warning cases, one central issue is how the risks of loss
should be distributed when there is imperfect-or even no-informa-
tion about anticipated loss and severity. To assume that the manufac-
turer has perfect knowledge of the relevant risk is to beg just this
question, and to drive the law into treating all cases of imperfect in-
formation as if the defendant had perfect information and the plaintiff
had none. One consequence of the Wade test is to shift huge residual
15 Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968).
16 See Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 469 (1987).
17 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
18 Id. at 834. The proposed parallel jury instruction read:
A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property]
that a reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of
its harmful character would not place it on the market. It is not necesary to find
that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the [product] in
order to determine that it was not duly safe.
Id. at 839-40. The brackets are Wade's insertions into this instruction. His subsequent emen-
dation of his earlier views are found in Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 734, 763 (1983) [hereinafter Wade, The
Effect of Knowledge].
19 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
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risks from defendants to plaintiffs, without any effort to explore the
incentive or administrative costs associated with that solution. Yet, as
Wade himself wrote a decade letter, he had no such grand intentions:
I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any
particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language. Its
usefulness, I thought, was in explaining the concept of strict liabil-
ity when it was new by clearly contrasting it with negligence in
which the defendant's actual culpability in failing to learn of the
dangerousness of the product had to be shown. It always had over-
tones of fiction, and, like all fictions, can create difficulties if taken
literally.2"
The inadvertent way in which product liability doctrine has
grown up has hampered the task of intelligent assessment and reform.
Even if we put aside the political obstacles to reform, there is an intel-
lectual task of the first order that still has to be solved: someone has to
indicate which changes in the law of product liability as it stood
before, say, 1960 were critical and which were less important. This
section addresses that question.
B. The Decline of Privity and of Freedom of Contract
The first distinctively "modern" development of product liability
law was ushered in by MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,21 where Judge
Cardozo removed the privity limitation in negligence cases, and rou-
tinely allowed the ultimate purchaser of a product to sue the original
manufacturer in negligence only. The effect of this decision was to
treat the "remote" seller, as he was then known, as though he were in
direct contractual privity with the plaintiff. Once in direct privity, the
plaintiff was necessarily "foreseeable" and hence was owed a duty of
care by the defendant under conventional substantive law. The ordi-
nary negligence action thus followed as the night does the day.
In practice, the level of product liability litigation did not in-
crease substantially on account of MacPherson. One measure of the
consequences of that case is the flat level of insurance premiums for
product liability that held firm in the decades that followed. All
through the 1940s and 1950s, premiums remained very low, whether
measured in absolute dollars or percentage of insurance sold. In some
instances, product liability insurance was quite literally given away, as
an added inducement to get more substantial lines of business, such as
general liability, premise liability or workers' compensation programs.
The simplest explanation for the stable condition of product liability
20 Wade, The Effect of Knowledge, supra note 18, at 764.
21 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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insurance premiums is probably the best. While plaintiffs could freely
sue, their recovery was effectively hedged in by a broad range of sub-
stantive requirements that survived the demise of privity. Negligence
itself could be difficult on occasion to prove, even with res ipsa loqui-
tur; the causal connection between defendant and plaintiff had to be
close-and most importantly, the conception of product defect was
quite narrow, and the scope of defenses based upon plaintiff miscon-
duct or assumption of risk was very broad. Several restrictive doc-
trines operating in tandem could do most of the work of the single
privity limitation-which, it should be added, was far from watertight
even before MacPherson.22 The earlier law had allowed some suits
against manufacturers. MacPherson allowed a few more. Recasting
the prior exceptions into a new rule was a conceptual tour de force,
which changed the outcome in some small percentage of cases, but
did not amount to any sea change in the law.
The first major shifts in received doctrine after MacPherson oc-
curred in two cases decided in the early 1960s, Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors23 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co. 24 These
two cases stood for two propositions that are closely entwined histori-
cally, but nonetheless analytically separable: the rejection of freedom
of contract and the adoption of strict liability (or implied warranty) in
torts cases.
First, both these cases contain an explicit attack on, and rejection
of, the principle of freedom of contract as it applies to product-related
injuries. In Henningsen, the conclusion followed a detailed discussion
about product warranties and the limitations on recovery that they
contained. Heavily influenced by the "contract of adhesion" writing
that dominated academic circles in the 1940s and 1950s, 25 Henning-
sen concluded that private limitations on warranties served no useful
22 See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). In fact,
the difference in practice between Huset and MacPherson was, I believe, quite small. The only
difference in outcome concerned those products that were imminently dangerous (e.g., defec-
tive car wheels) but not inherently so (e.g., poisons). Under Huset, the plaintiff could recover
for imminently dangerous products only if the defendant knew of the defect in the product
when marketed. Under MacPherson, recovery for this class of defect could occur on the same
conditions as that for products inherently dangerous. On this point, MacPherson marked a
small improvement and expansion over the earlier law. I have said a kind word for the general
approach of Huset in Epstein, Product Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645
(1985). See also, Schwartz, supra note 8, at 797.
23 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
24 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
25 See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943). For analysis of Kessler's work as it applied to products liabil-
ity, see Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 483-96 (1985).
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social purpose, and were therefore an attempt by manufacturers to
distance themselves from the harmful consequences of the defective
products they had placed into the stream of commerce. The analysis
was in accordance with the dominant learning of the time, which, in
retrospect, is strikingly incomplete. The court focused solely upon
the effects of the warranty upon recovery, given that the injury had
occurred. At no point did the court ask how warranties could reduce
the level of cross-subsidization across consumers, control against the
problems of consumer moral hazard, or allow consumers to unbundle
their purchases of insurance from that of automobiles. These are all
important constraints upon the use of warranties in consumer con-
texts, and there is no obvious reason why these concerns cease to be of
real importance when the plaintiff's injury moves from product fail-
ure to personal injury or property damage.26 On the one hand, the
large potential losses from property damage and personal injury sug-
gest a greater role for contract provisions, not a smaller one. On the
other hand, the frequency of product failure is likely to be higher than
that of personal injuries. The relative expected importance of each
type of loss is hard to determine in the abstract. Yet so long as each
type of loss is important, the contract approach-although not neces-
sarily the identical contract terms-seems sensible.
All these complications were not understood. Instead, firms
were potential villains, who had to be checked. Consumers were vir-
tuous, and had to be protected. The standard economic assumption
that contracts work ex ante for the mutual benefit of both sides was
never -mentioned, let alone examined. Sales were regarded as imposi-
tions upon purchasers, who themselves were unable to take effective
precautions against loss. The strict liability rules, which make sense
in stranger cases,27 were carried over without question to this branch
of the law.
Henningsen established an instant judicial consensus. Just two
years later in Greenman, Justice Traynor could confidently say:
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but
imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to de-
fine the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contrast
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.2"
This sentence captures perfectly the dominant view of the law today.
26 See, e.g., Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981); Ep-
stein, supra note 22, at 656-58.
27 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E & I. App. 330 (1868).
28 Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
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With contract rejected, the next question was what standard of
liability the law should impose. The answer that was reached in both
Henningsen and Greenman was strict liability. There is no question
that this system has advantages over the alternative negligence view of
the subject. One factual issue is removed from consideration at trial,
and the defendant has a clearer sense of the net expenses that it could
incur from the product in question. Indeed in the context of both
Henningsen and Greenman, as well as the pre-Restatement (Second)
of Torts cases, the strict liability rule looks quite effective. Both cases
involved relatively new products with latent defects that failed in or-
dinary use. The strict liability standard thus did not appear to open
any floodgates, or to pose any major threats in the underlying integ-
rity of tort law. The relative want of any short-term institutional re-
sponse shows that the immediate consequences of both cases were
essentially benign.
Nonetheless, the anticontractual bias of both Henningsen and
Greenman has proved to have devastating long-term consequences for
the soundness of the product liability system. The system of product
liability was stripped of its powers of self-correction. In essence, Hen-
ningsen, Greenman, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts reserved
to the courts a legal monopoly to fashion the relevant terms and con-
ditions on which all products should be sold in all relevant markets.
The centralization of power has the same consequences here that it
has in other areas of government regulation. It leads to a legal regime
that is unresponsive to changes in demand or technology. The judi-
cial standard form becomes a Procrustean bed into which all private
transactions have to fit at their peril. It may well be the case that
certain uniform provisions are appropriate for the full range of prod-
uct liability cases. But if the optimal solution is one that cuts off the
tort liability for consequential damages, then a judicial rule that ren-
ders tort liability nonwaivable will not only be uniform, but also
wrong in every case. More likely, in practice there may be important
variations in the kinds of terms that are appropriate for certain classes
of products and defects. Strict liability on manufacturers for contami-
nation of products sold in sealed containers may make good sense, but
far more complex allocation of risks may be appropriate in design and
warning cases, especially when third party intermediaries- employ-
ees or physicians-have special, and varying, roles to play. Yet here,
too, all efforts to find better ways to sell and market products are cut
off before they are born, so that new information about product liabil-
ity terms cannot be generated by voluntary transactions. Today all
doctrinal innovation has to come from the courts, where the technical
2202 [Vol. 10:2193
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lags and information deficits are at their highest.29 Yet there is no
alternative forum, save legislation, in which to override judgments
when they have proved mistaken; indeed, there is no way to find out
whether they are mistaken at all.
This anticontractual line of decisions took hold because of the
fear of contracts of adhesion, or because of a sense that it is simply too
costly for consumers to acquire the needed information about whether
certain forms of disclaimers are efficient. 30 Arguments of this sort
have of late received strong endorsement, not only from the tradi-
tional believers of government regulation, but also from the ostensible
supporters of market institutions within the law and economics tradi-
tion. In their recent book The Economic Structure of Tort Law,3 1
Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue that the current prohibi-
tions against contracting out are justified in economic terms precisely
because consumers are said to lack the information that is necessary
to allow them to respond intelligently to the disclaimers. At one level,
the argument is directed to any default provisions that might pre-
sumptively limit the scope of liability. In this context, there is little
reason to doubt that they are correct, at least insofar as the questions
at hand concern the traditional class of product defect-contaminated
food cases, and exploding coke bottles, for example-where there are
latent defects in the bottle that are not revealed by ordinary use.
There are -very few occasions in which the manufacturer would want
to contract out, precisely because any disclaimer-"not responsible
for botulism," or "not responsible for exploding bottles that cause se-
rious bodily injuries in ordinary use"-does convey to the consumer
all the information that he needs to have in order to decide to buy
elsewhere.3 2 This exclusion advertises that the product is not safe, so
buy from some other producer who will, if anything, capitalize on his
willingness to "stand behind his product," as most manufacturers of
foodstuffs and bottled drinks eagerly will.
Default provisions are surely important, if only because they in-
fluence the costs of contracting to the proper social position. There is,
moreover, no reason to think that the presumption in food and drink
29 For a short account of the major differences between the way in which courts and pro-
fessional organizations disseminate information, see Brown, Comment on Calabresi and
Klevorick's 'Four Tests for Liability in Torts," 14 J. Legal Stud. 629 (1985).
30 W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 280-84 (1987). The
material in the book is derived. from, Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535, 543-547 (1985).
31 W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 30.
32 See, e.g., Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J.
Legal Stud. 241 (1983), which argues that one reason for warranties is to spare the consumer
the need to acquire information about the goods so warranted.
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cases carries over to drugs and complex capital equipment. For a
wide range of products, the larger battle is not over default presump-
tions, but over the right to contract out of them. On this issue,
Landes and Posner place far too great a weight on imperfect
information:
Given the high costs (relative to benefits) of information about an
extremely low-probability event, the expected damages from which
are low, it may not pay a consumer to study a disclaimer of liabil-
ity carefully, even if the disclaimer is clear and conspicuous. Man-
ufacturers will then reap little consumer ill will from fooling
consumers with disclaimers that consumers fail to read, because
product accidents are so rare anyway, and for the same reason
competing manufacturers will not find it profitable to try to com-
pete by offering to disclaim disclaimers. High information costs
relative to the benefits of the information may defeat voluntary
contracting.33
The argument is badly misguided. One critical empirical ques-
tion concerns the frequency and severity of product liability claims.
Where these are high, then the incentives themselves to individuate by
contract should be great. Yet on this question, Landes and Posner
cite, suggestively to be sure, only a single 1919 case that involved
"catching anthrax from a shaving brush."34 The present battleground
in products liability is over products with very different characteris-
tics, uses, and failure rates. Thus, product liability insurance for pri-
vate airplanes is a very large fraction of the total purchase price,
amounting perhaps to $75,000 or more per plane.35 -And the prospect
of liability for defective drugs in such cases as MER/29 and Bendec-
tin, or defective prosthetic devices, are very large matters indeed.
Even in the context of exploding Coke bottles, the de minimis argu-
ment is flawed, for while the frequency of accidents may be low, the
number of repeat purchases is very large, so that contracting with the
consumer would be worthwhile if the manufacturers wanted to dis-
claim the risk.36 But with respect to the major aviation, automotive,
drug, and machine tool cases, it is wholly misguided. The issue of
33 W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 30, at 281-82.
34 S.H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 F. 331 (5th Cir. 1919).
35 Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1566.
Priest's figures are $80,000 for a Beech aircraft and $75,000 for each Piper Aircraft, as re-
ported in the first quarter of 1986. The numbers are doubtless higher today, if only because of
inflation. The 1986 Report on the Product Liability Reform Act (S. Rep. 2760, 99 Cong., 2d
Sess.) at 7, places the figure at $70,000 per airplane and reports a drop in sales in the general
aviation market of 90 percent since 1979.
36 See, e.g., Danzon, Comment on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 569, 572 (1985).
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liability for personal injuries and consequential damages is always on
everyone's mind. In commercial contexts, the relevant clauses are
often carefully tailored and explicitly negotiated. Contractual silence
on personal injuries in consumer sales is not a function of private in-
difference. It is a consequence of the certain invalidity of any terms
that might be inserted by contract.
The Landes and Posner model prohibiting disclaimers, then, can-
not rest upon any assertion that the issue is too unimportant for con-
tracts to matter. Instead, it only makes sense if one believes in the
skewed distribution of loss prevention skills posited by the modern
cases. But why should manufacturers, out of possession of the prod-
uct at the time of injury, be conclusively and universally presumed to
be in a better position to avoid loss than "helpless" consumers in pos-
session of the goods? There is little reason to think that this odd bal-
ance of prevention capabilities has ever been true in the general case-
possession gives both control and information. The nineteenth-cen-
tury cases set their presumptions in the opposite way to the modern
law, precisely because of these reasons. The most relevant difference
between the two eras lies in the cost of getting information about the
product from producer to consumer-it must be lower today than it
was in earlier times. If anything, therefore, we should expect a com-
mon law court today to be more sympathetic to contract arrange-
ments since the cost of their implementation has fallen. Landes and
Posner reach the opposite position only because they are so wedded to
their "positive" theory that the common law rules of liability must be
"efficient," when so often they are not. They can verify their Panglos-
sian hypothesis only by altering their underlying description of pro-
ducer and consumer behavior to fit modern legal doctrine. The
consequence is to render plausible the legal conclusions that interven-
tionist judges have reached on other grounds, such as inequality of
bargaining power and adhesion contracts-grounds that Landes and
Posner would generally reject.37 Their insistence on nonwaivability is
yet another version of the Nirvana fallacy that measures the imperfec-
tions of voluntary contracts implicitly against some ideal, but unat-
tainable, system of judicial control. The rigidities of centralized
planning are as important in the context of the market for contract
terms as they are in the market for widgets.
C. Doctrinal Modifications: Defects and Defenses
The inability to have private self-correction from decisions at the
37 See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 102-13 (3rd ed. 1986) urging that com-
petitive pressures lead to the right set of contractual terms.
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center soon revealed its cost, as the next wave of judicial tort reform
had very different allocative consequences from the modest judicial
innovations of Henningsen and Greenman. Here, it is necessary to
mention three important developments, each of which took place be-
tween 1968 and 1976. These are the adoption of the risk/utility test
for design defects, the expansion of duty to warn liability both for
drug and mass immunization cases, and the elimination of the open
and obvious defect test, as it stood under the earlier law up to Hen-
ningsen and Greenman. These changes all point in the same direc-
tion: a rejection of markets in favor of explicit government control,
parallel to that which occurred in the administrative area. The earlier
law generally had a pro-market bias because its default rules all
stressed the importance of communication from the product seller to
the product consumer, who could then make informed choices on the
basis of the information about the product that was presented to him.
The constant stress was on liability for latent or hidden defects, be-
cause it was precisely these that the consumer could not be expected
to guard against by ordinary care.
The second generation of rules took exactly the opposite tack.
By the 1970s, the transmission of information about risks was no
longer the sole, or even dominant, object of the law. Instead, the sys-
tem was designed to nullify the choices that had been made by indi-
vidual consumers, even with full information, on the ground that
public agencies-typically the courts-were better able to make these
choices for them. The shift from market to regulation is far more
profound than any shift from negligence to strict liability, when both
liability rules are confined to the class of latent defects. Yet today the
strict liability/negligence choice, not the latent/patent distinction, re-
ceives all the attention, and all the pressure for legislative reform."a
1. Design Defects
The elimination of the negligence requirement in product liabil-
ity cases brought to the fore the question of what counted as a prod-
uct defect. In Greenman, Justice Traynor relied upon a conception of
product defect that stressed the misrepresentation to the product user
based on the product appearance, its accompanying literature, and the
circumstances of its sale. "Implicit in the machine's presence on the
38 See, e.g., Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent, and Policy
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 1986). See also S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (Product Construction and Design)
and § 6 (Product Warnings and Instructions) (1985), both of which contain language that
incorporates negligence standards.
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market, however, was a representation that it would safely do the jobs
for which it was built."39 As such, the law of product defect bore a
close affinity with the law of "traps" that had always been of such
importance in, say, occupiers' liability cases.4' Once the negligence
limitation on recovery had been removed, this conception of defect
(oftentimes styled "the consumer expectations" model)4" set the
threshold for liability. But in retrospect, it seems clear that it could
not survive the anticontractual bias of the courts. The theory of im-
plied misrepresentation was articulated as part of the attack on free-
dom of contract in Greenman. But given that individual consumers
could not sign disclaimers of liability, there was no reason to expect
that they could sensibly evaluate all the options associated with the
use of complex products, even with knowledge of the risks. The law
had to do that for them. Toward this end, the definition of product
defect was expanded to facilitate the necessary substitution of collec-
tive for individual judgment.
The tools that were available for that transition were, however,
quite limited. It became clear that the standard of customary prac-
tice, itself discredited in ordinary negligence cases,4 2 could not possi-
bly be revived in the new product liability environment. The dictates
of custom and contract converge so closely that each is considered
some variant upon the market standard. "Real" strict liability, of the
sort which allows no cost/benefit analysis at all, could not be adopted
either. While it may be sensible to make a polluter pay for pollution
damage inflicted upon a stranger, no matter how great his level of
precautions, it simply makes no sense to say that whenever a product
is "involved" in an injury, it has necessarily been defective. Some
collisions are too devastating even for the strongest cars to withstand;
39 Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701 (1963).
40 See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985),
where strict liability was imposed only for concealed defects. "We do not determine whether
strict liability would apply to a disclosed defect." Id. at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 219 n.4.
41 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i. "The article sold must be dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
The standard here explicitly rules out subjective assumption of risk as defining defects. The
subjective element does come in for those cases where a product with a latent defect has been
sold, for their specific knowledge of the defect can lead to the "unreasonable" assumption of
risk defense set out in comment n.
42 See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.). This case has had
an enormous influence in the product liability context, especially after the Second Restate-
ment. The single sentence "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices," 60 F.2d at 740, has itself been worth billions of dollars in transfer
payments.
19891 2207
HeinOnline  -- 10 Cardozo L. Rev.  2207 1988-1989
2208 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2193
and the only machine tool that is completely safe is also completely
inoperative. The complex duties between product maker and product
user cannot be set by the simple "keep off" type of tests which charac-
terize actions for trespass to land and nuisance.
By process of elimination, there was only one standard to invoke:
cost/benefit. Oddly enough, the standard itself rings of the Hand
formula and thus seems to invoke the very standards of negligence
which the earlier strict liability cases such as Henningsen and Green-
man had repudiated.43 There was a wide range of variations on the
basic cost/benefit standard,"4 and which should be adopted was an
open question. The early cases, such as Larsen v. General Motors, all
relied upon "general" negligence principles, as they applied to the
new circumstances of automobile crashes. Thereafter, Professor
Wade's risk/utility standard gave a more complicated version of the
cost/benefit calculations that incorporated some explicit mention of
the plaintiff's knowledge.45 Finally, such cases as Barker v. Lull En-
gineering Co.,46 held firm to some version of cost/benefit analysis
while shifting to the defendant the burden of proof on product defect.
Any continuity with pre-1960 cases is something of a mirage. De-
fendants would have obtained directed verdicts in the vast bulk of
machine tool and automobile cases under the narrower standards of
43 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 130, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972), noted how the use of an "unreasonably dangerous" standard as found in
Restatement (Second) of Torts "rings in negligence."
44 See Wheeler, Comment on Landes and Posner, 14 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1985).
45 (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by set-
ting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 17, at 837-38. For my recent criticism of the formula, see Epstein, supra
note 16.
46 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978). The negligence
elements in the case are apparent inasmuch as the plaintiff was allowed to establish a defect by
showing that the product's design proximately caused his injury, and the defendant failed to
establish that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh its inherent risk of danger. Id.
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liability prior to Larsen,4 and even under the tests for design defects
set out in Dix Noel's 1962 article on the subject.48
2. Warning
A similar pattern emerges in the warning cases. Here, ostensibly
the warning cases are congruent with the older version of product
liability cases, because full disclosure of latent defects can well be re-
garded as an effort to insure consumer choice. Yet the underlying
motivation of the modern cases is somewhat different. As with all
things, information is costly to collect and to process. It is just not
clear how much information any consumer would want before decid-
ing to purchase or use a particular good. Thus, in drug and immuni-
zation cases, there is an argument for saying that some overall,
"bottom-line" assessment of the riskiness of a drug provides a con-
sumer with greater information than a detailed, separate account of
each remote affliction, especially when the exhaustive explanation is
provided without any explicit estimate of the tiny probabilities of each
untoward occurrence. Most warning cases insist upon a level of
warning ex post that is far higher than what is in fact demanded by
consumers ex ante. Every consumer cannot be the marginal con-
sumer, sensitive to small changes in phraseology or nuance.
In some instances, the justification for heavy liability depends
less on the justice of the individual case, and more upon the political
and strategic instincts of the judges. Heavy tort liability is viewed as a
47 There is here also the problem of selection bias. Cases of the older, latent defect/ordi-
nary use variety are so clearly in the plaintiff's camp on liability that they will not be appealed
on the basic question of product defect. They could amount to an important segment of cases,
but however measured their importance seems small relative to the new generation of
crashworthiness cases ushered in by Larsen, which, by the way, the defendant won on the facts
when the case was thereafter tried.
48 Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale
L.J. 816 (1962). The piece was cited in Schwartz, supra note 8, at 799, as evidence of the
continuity in the law. But even a cursory look at particular fact patterns illustrates the gulf
that separates the two bodies of law. Thus, Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 338 Ill. App. 364, 87
N.E.2d 307 (1949), aff'd, 407 I11. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950), involved a vaporizor that set itself
on fire when it continued to generate heat after the water in it had boiled away. And in
Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961), the design defect involved a leak in
the gas tank of a car which resulted in an explosion when the plaintiff turned the key in the
ignition. These are a far cry from the crashworthiness and foreseeable misuse cases that we
have today, as both involve latent defects and normal use. Virtually all the other cases cited in
Noel's scrupulously careful article fall into this pattern. Indeed, many of the cases cited in-
volved defective materials which crumbled or-broke. See, e.g., Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44
F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (tractor steering wheel broke free causing user to fall from seat).
Greenman, with its bad set of screws, falls into this class of cases. While negligence is men-
tioned extensively, crashworthiness is not. To see the distance we have traveled, compare
Blitzstein with the hundreds of modern design defect cases. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
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way-station along the road to a comprehensive system of no-fault lia-
bility, say for vaccination injuries, that the judges could not impose-
and fund-on their own initiative. Instead, the effort is to induce the
drug companies to lobby for such a comprehensive program as part
and parcel of an effort to reduce or eliminate their own tort liabili-
ties.49 But these judicial efforts to "game" the system easily can go
astray in the face of the counter-strategies available to private firms.
Firms seek to maximize profits, not to preserve their market share. If
the costs of getting vaccine legislation are too high, then they will
prefer leaving the market to the status quo rather than mounting the
legislative action. While some judges may believe that industry still
holds Congress captive on issues in which they have a vital interest,
the political picture is far more clouded as other groups find it in their
interest to keep the tort system just as it is.
But suppose what is not the case, that the judges have made the
correct political calculations. Even then, there is still reason to doubt
that the game is worth the candle. Consider in this context two alter-
native states of the world. In the first, ten persons per year suffer
devastating injuries from vaccines for which they receive no compen-
sation at all. In the second, the delays in innovation and the increase
in costs result in one hundred persons suffering from the same inju-
ries, for which ninety percent of them receive "full" compensation. If
the goal of the system is to maximize the percentage of victims who
receive compensation, then we should prefer the second to the first. If
the goal is to minimize the number of uncompensated users, then we
should be indifferent to the two results. But if it is to minimize the
probability of harm, then we should prefer the first, especially since
the released administrative costs could be redirected in part to the
next generation of safer vaccines. The system-wide costs of the vac-
cine program have been documented time and again. It cannot be
assumed that victim compensation and loss minimization go hand in
hand. Given manufacturer self-interest, it is not possible to obtain the
third state of the world in which the number of injuries is ten and the
number of compensated injuries is ten as well. So long as manufactur-
ers are free to enter and exit the market, there is no invisible hand to
insure that they will behave as judges or legislators hope they will.
3. Open and Obvious Conditions
The last piece of the puzzle concerns the status of defenses. In a
49 See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
The Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1985); Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of
Modem Tort, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2263 (1989).
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world in which freedom of contract operates, assumption of risk by
contract must be accepted. Before 1960, it was difficult to put the
common law to the test, for there was scant occasion for any manu-
facturer to incur the costs of contracting out from product liability.
In part, that outcome rests on the traditional position that open and
obvious conditions were never actionable, whether or not they were
specifically known by the plaintiff.s° This traditional position is justi-
fied on the ground that the obviousness of the risk transmits whatever
information the defendant could usefully provide to the plaintiff.
There was simply too great a moral hazard to allow persons to claim
that they did not know of risks obvious to persons of ordinary intelli-
gence. The assumption of risk defense therefore was relegated to
cases in which plaintiffs in fact acquired knowledge of latent risks,
which they then chose to incur.
This version of the open and obvious defense comports well with
the freedom of contract model. It says that the private decision to
proceed in the face of a known risk is binding upon the organs of the
state. But any steadfast adherence to the open and obvious defense is
inconsistent with the interventionist models of product liability law
that .depend on collective cost/benefit accounts of product defect.
Again the mismatch in orientations could not survive, so that once
the wider causes of action were in place, the "open and obvious" test
was repudiated with evident eagerness: "The time has come to depart
from the patent danger rule enunciated in Campo v. Scofield "" was
the first sentence in Micallef v. Miehle Co. ,52 a case which did just
that. In place of the older rule came the same reasonableness calcula-
tions used to determine product defect, so that the entire case rou-
tinely lands in the lap of the jury with neither rule nor compass to
guide it. The question of obviousness is now stated to go to the issue
of whether a warning should be given. But it will not preclude an
action for a design defect, even under the legislation proposed to cut
50 See, e.g. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). Noel does not treat
the obviousness of the risk as a conclusive defense in these cases, and argues that the ordinary
negligence calculus survives, taking his cue from F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts
§ 28.5 (1956). Noel, supra note 48, at 838. But both Noel, on the one hand, and Harper and
James on the other, are quite critical of the Campo decision and use the negligence analysis as
a counterweight to it. In essence, they give what might be regarded as a "restrictive" reading
of the precedents. And even if they were correct in this, it is clear from the Noel article that
the latent/patent distinction had far more bite in 1962 than it has today, even if it was in the
initial stages of breaking down.
51 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
52 39 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (1976). Campo had
been written by Judge Fuld only 25 years earlier. The difference marks a small revolution in
thought.
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back on the modern judicial innovations.53
4. The Payoff
The differences between the market and regulatory approaches
are well illustrated by two possible views of the cigarette cases. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted general strict liability, and
then proceeded to exclude ordinary cigarettes from its coverage.
Comment i first announces a defect test that fits the market model:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics .... Good tobacco is not unreasonably danger-
ous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but to-
bacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous.
5 4
Under the above Restatement rule, which is arguably more re-
strictive than the case law of the time,55 all modern cigarette cancer
cases are directed verdicts for the defendant, even with strict liability
firmly in place. The product is not defective even if it is dangerous,
because the dangers are not "to an extent beyond" what ordinary cig-
arette smokers know. With the product defect so defined, there is no
reason to get into the questions of subjective knowledge raised by as-
sumption of risk. Under the Restatement formulation, the only cases
of defective cigarettes were those for contaminated products-a trivial
concern, and certainly one for which no tobacco company would
want to disclaim.
The new causes of action rest upon the modern theories of warn-
ing and risk/utility, in which allegations of addiction are incorporated
53 See, e.g., Product Liability Act, S. Rep. No. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 15 (1985)
which provides: -(e) A product is not unreasonably dangerous for lacking of warnings regard-
ing-(l) dangers that are obvious."
The section as drafted does not extend the obviousness defense to design defect cases,
which are in turn governed by the elaborate negligence standards set out in § 5 of the Act.
54 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965).
55 This rule was not consistently followed in the cigarette litigation that preceded adoption
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for cases did get to the jury on ordinary negligence
principles, and indeed were won on the ground that the risks of tobacco were, at least in the
early years, such that "no developed human skill or foresight can afford knowledge." Ross v.
Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 6 (8th Cir. 1964) (emphasis supplied). Ross also expressly
refused to carry the strict liability rules over to the cigarette cases. "[I]n our considered view,
if presented with the facts in this case, the Missouri courts would not apply the strict rules of
the 'fly in the bottle cases' but-on the contrary, would limit absolute liability to the same
extent that such liability was limited here by the district court." Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
But the first generation of cigarette cases did not have risk/utility to turn to, and were heavily
influenced by the draft versions of the Restatement. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
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to undercut the assumption of risk defense.5 6 These cases, to the ex-
tent they are not covered by the preemption statutes, 57 render any
simple per se disposition of these cases quite impossible. Each jury is
now in a position to decide whether new technologies-which have
faced important regulatory barriers"--could have allowed the mar-
keting of a safer cigarette, or whether the risks of smoking are so great
that it was "negligent" to market cigarettes at all. On the plaintiff's
side, ordinary knowledge is no longer thought to be an accurate re-
flection of the knowledge of any individual smoker. The upshot is a
detailed "life-style" examination of the mental state of each smoker to
learn when he first learned of the risks of smoking and how well he
internalized them. The per se rule of the Restatement has been under-
mined by a formless type of litigation which has yet to yield a plain-
tiff's verdict, but which has imposed enormous litigation and
uncertainty costs that the older sensible per se rules have avoided.
Within the context of product liability law, the big shift has been the
now completed movement from no liability to liability, even if con-
fined to liability "only" for negligence. The secondary shift, still un-
resolved, between negligence and strict liability is small by
comparison, especially since any feasible strict liability standard itself
has to be phrased, as noted above, in reasonableness terms.
II. DISTRIBUTIVE AND ALLOCATIVE CONSEQUENCES
What distributional and allocative consequences have flowed
from these changes in product liability law? The question is impor-
tant in two ways. First, it facilitates an assessment of the magnitude
and desirability of the recent doctrinal changes on their merits. Sec-
ond, it helps explain why it has proved impossible to fashion any so-
56 See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1423 (1980), which is generally credited with having ushered in the second wave of ciga-
rette litigation.
57 See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The mandatory
warnings specified in the Act have been held to preempt any common law tort action based
upon a failure to provide an adequate warning; see, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789
F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1986); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). (For the
record, I should state that I was a legal consultant to Phillip Morris in both cases.) The
decision in both these cases turned upon the special language of the cigarette statute. Still, the
basic pattern in these cases-that mandated warnings are conclusively presumed adequate-
could be carried over with profit to drug and similar cases. For a recent attack on both Cip-
polone and Palmer, see Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and
Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 897 (1988).
58 See, e.g., Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, Regulation, Nov./Dec. 1986,
at 35, which points out, among other things, that the costs for innovation are higher when the
company that makes the innovation is not allowed to advertise its advantages on health and
safety grounds.
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cially desirable and politically viable program of product liability
reform during the past ten or so years. In dealing with these doctrinal
changes, it is necessary to distinguish between the impact of the rules
on products not yet placed in the stream of commerce and those previ-
ously placed in the stream of commerce, which, owing to their dura-
bility, have not been involved in any accident as of the introduction of
the rules. The distinction is thus between the prospective and retroac-
tive application of the rules, of especial importance here because of
the potential useful life of many capital goods and the long-term dele-
terious effects of many drugs and chemicals.59
A. Future Injuries from Future Products
The basic analysis of this class of cases seems clear enough on the
strength of what has already been said. The common law restrictions
on freedom of contract are not justified by any concern with externali-
ties, or with duress, fraud, and incompetence of individual consumers.
(The alleged imperfect information problem could be cured by limited
disclosure rules if thought to be a problem, which generally it is not.)
The general conclusion about social welfare thus appears to apply to
the particular case. While it might be a question whether greater
losses will be suffered by consumers or producers, both groups will ex
ante be worse off to the extent that the legal rules preclude bargains
that work to their mutual advantage. The exact distribution of losses
may vary from product to product, as a function of elasticity of de-
mand (the greater the elasticity, the larger the producer loss), indus-
try structure, rate of product innovation, and the like. But there is
little reason to think that there are any positive outcomes that result
in forcing products off the market that consumers are prepared to
purchase.
The distributional consequences of this class of cases is harder to
determine. George Priest has made the argument that the imposition
of the modern product liability law operates like a regressive tax, be-
cause it imposes greater losses upon the poor for the benefit of the
rich.60 The intuition behind his position may be tested against the
59 It should be understood that by retroactive effect, I am looking at the problem only from
the point of view of the defendant who has parted with possession. The transaction is not
retroactive from the point of view of the actual (or manifested) injury, which will occur in the
future. I assume that everyone agrees that cases already litigated or settled should not be
reopened because of a subsequent change in the law. On retroactivity as it applies to legisla-
tion, see Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 425 (1982).
60 Priest, supra note 35, at 1565, 1585-86. See also Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48
Ohio St. L.J. 497, 502 (1987):
The irony, however, is that the expansion of third-party tort law insurance directly
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problem of worker injury with machine tools. As applied to this con-
text, Priest's argument is that the more prosperous workers will have
greater tort damages, funded by revenues drawn equally from all
workers. The conclusion is, therefore, that the more prosperous
workers could emerge as net winners and the less prosperous ones as
net losers.
There are, however, several problems with this line of reasoning.
First, there is no reason to think that either class of workers is neces-
sarily better off. It could well be that the overall losses that flow from
the restriction on contractual freedom hit one class of workers harder
than the other. But that result is fully consistent with the proposition
that both classes of workers have lost, albeit to different extents.
Second, one implicit assumption of the Priest model is that the
probability of injury is constant for the two classes of workers (or
consumers generally), so that the redistribution is attributable to the
larger damages paid the skilled class relative to the unskilled. None-
theless, there is no obvious reason to believe that probabilities of in-
jury are constant across income levels and some reason to guess that
the reverse might be the case. Thus, so long as there is some element
of uncompensated loss upon prospective plaintiffs, they will have
some incentive to take care against risks. Well-to-do and skilled
plaintiffs may stand to lose more income if they do not recover, and
this might serve to induce them to take greater care. In addition, if
they are skillful workers or knowledgeable consumers, their costs of
avoidance might be lower than those for poorer, less skilled persons.
There is some reason to believe, for example, that a very large fraction
of accidents occurs to workers who have just started to work on new
types of equipment.6 If these assumptions hold, then we have to re-
vise our assumption on the distribution of accidents. Relative to
harms the poor among the consumer population. Obviously, the general price in-
crease consequent to the expansion of liability affects those with low levels of re-
sources most seriously. More importantly, the benefit low-income consumers
receive from the addition of the liability insurance premium to the price of a prod-
uct or service is worth less to them than its price. Again, the liability insurance
premium tied to the sale of a product or service must be set according to the
average expected liability payout. Tort judgments comprise medical expenditures,
which are typically greater for higher income patients; past and future lost income;
and damages representing pain and suffering, which are highly correlated with lost
income. The high correlation of these damage elements with income, however,
means that the premiums set equal to the average damage payout will undercharge
high income consumers and overcharge low income consumers. The provision of
liability insurance tied to the sale of products and services requires the low income
to subsidize the high income.
61 Here it would be desirable to have explicit empirical support for the proposition, but the
appellate decisions do have a very large number of cases in which accidents appear to occur on
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skilled workers, new workers may well have a higher frequency of
accidents, and the accidents that they suffer may also be more severe.
The question is, of course, empirical in the end, but the redistribution
may well run from the lower to the higher skilled workers.
The situation becomes still cloudier when the position of the em-
ployer is explicitly factored into the account. The employer has sub-
rogation rights against the employee's tort recovery, and these rights
might consume a larger portion of the tort recovery from low-skilled
workers whose damage awards are presumably less. Generalizations
on the regressive effects of the tort law are not sustainable as a matter
of theory, nor at present verifiable by any empirical evidence. All that
we can say with confidence is that general progressive tax systems,
with all their flaws, are better agents for redistribution from rich to
poor than any modification of common law liability rules.
The expansion of the product liability system has also placed
great strains upon the relationship between product suppliers and
their insurers. The problem arises even where the changes in liability
are wholly prospective, that is, arise with respect to products that
have yet to be manufactured or sold. But here it may well be that
insurance is not workable in the market at all because the underlying
tort risks, and their associated administrative costs are too hard to
price. In principle, it appears that the insurer might protect itself
against the vagaries of the tort system by contractual stipulations.
But these are no more reliable than the judicial interpretation that
they receive, and the aggressive use of the principle of contra profer-
entem means that insurance companies have to bear the systematic
risk that they will sign on to one deal only to be found that they are
bound by yet another.62 The lack of confidence in judicial interpreta-
the first days of work, when the force of habit does not yet control. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
62 See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982). There, the policy contained a pollution exclusion
which, however, did not apply "if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental." Id. at 186 N.J. Super. at 160, 451 A.2d at 991-92. As Professor Abraham notes:
"As to the meaning of the terms 'sudden and accidental' in the pollution exclusion itself, the
court simply read them out of existence." Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits
of Insurance, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 942, 963 (1988). How else does one interpret a sentence that
reads as follows: "[T]he act or acts are sudden and accidental regardless of how many deposits
or dispersals may have occurred, and although the permeation of pollution into the ground-
water may have been gradual rather than sudden, the behavior of the pollutants as they seeped
into the aquifer is irrelevant if the permeation was unexpected." 159 N.J. Super. at 165, 451
A.2d at 994.
I discuss these points in Epstein, Products Liability As An Insurance Market, 15 J. Legel
Stud. 645 (1985). For further discussion of the insurance problem, see Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987); Trebilcock, The Social
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tion necessarily leads insurance companies to adopt fallback positions,
to favor clear exclusions, large deductibles, co-insurance features,
caps, and the like, all of which give the insured ex ante protection less
desirable than would otherwise be available. This option also deprives
insurance companies of their potential gains from trade as well, for no
one ever made a profit from leaving the market. As ever, prospective
redistribution always has its negative allocative consequences.
B. Future Injuries from Existing Products
The scope for redistribution becomes far more extensive when
the legal changes are imposed upon products that are already in the
marketplace. Many drugs, chemicals, and machine tools were sold
years ago, when the dominant set of product liability rules sharply
limited the exposure of manufacturers and retailers. Yet these prod-
ucts have endured longer than the legal regime under which they have
been marketed. Machine tools made before 1950 are, with modifica-
tions and after resale, still in active use today. (The companies that
made them, if still in business, are apt to have been the superior com-
petitors in their line of business.) Drugs and chemicals that were first
used during that same period could well have harmful effects that first
manifest themselves only in a later generation.
The consequences for redistribution are far greater when the law
changes between the time of sale and the time of injury. Yet here the
general response of the common law to the problem has been to ig-
nore it, just as it does with other areas of tort law.6 3 The argument
made on behalf of that position rests heavily upon the perception that
the changes in liability rules were of an incremental sort, of the kind
that could-or should-have been foreseen by the reasonable product
manufacturer, even before the modern developments took place. The
prevalent attitude is similar to that found in other areas, where the
norm against retroactive legislation has eroded in recent years.64 Ba-
sically, the argument holds that so long as there is notice of the pro-
spective changes, a responsible party can take them into account in
making the basic decision. At some level, the point is surely correct,
but it hardly justifies the conclusion that is drawn from it. While
knowledge might allow a party to mitigate the loss, it never enables
Insurance-Deterrence Delemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspec-
tive of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 (1987).
63 See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 813-28.
64 With regard to taxation, see generally Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroac-
tivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 (1977).
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him to reach the same level of utility that he could have reached if the
rules were sufficiently stable so that he need not mitigate at all.
Notice allows firms to minimize their losses. But it is an open
question whether the remaining losses, even when minimized, will be
large or small. With ordinary tort actions, the retroactive effects of
legal change tend to be small: automobile accidents are snapshot
torts, which are processed in relatively quick time. But the "inven-
tory" of old products which are then judged by new rules is quite
large. This retroactive imposition of liability has adverse conse-
quences on both issues of incentives and distribution that are simply
too large to ignore.
On incentives, there is little that prospective defendants can do to
minimize the loss from old products. The manufacturer may have no
idea who is in possession of a machine tool it made in 1950 or who
ingested its drugs. Nor does liability insurance afford any protection.
Any additional insurance coverage will be priced at levels that reflect
the present levels of risk, and not those when the product was first
made and sold. The change in legal rules functions like a giant incho-
ate lien ready to descend on particular assets upon the occurrence of
an injury. Insurance may liquidate in part this anticipated liability-a
net gain for a risk averse firm-but it will not make the lien disappear;
nor will it afford the manufacturer a chance to recoup its additional
costs by extracting a retroactive price increase from its original pur-
chaser. Some decrease in firm net worth necessarily follows. Dissolu-
tion of the firm may be the only way to escape the lien, given that
various doctrines of successor liability effectively undercut any at-
tempt to defeat this inchoate lien by a sale of underlying assets.6"
On the plaintiff side, the situation is mixed. With respect to some
products that cause latent injuries, there is also little that can be done.
But for many situations, this is not the case. This is surely the result
with ordinary accidents involving machine tools and the like, for
greater precaution yields lower levels of accidents. It also applies to
many toxic torts, such as asbestos. Exercise, diet, or quitting smoking
or drinking can have a vast effect upon the probability or severity of
injury. Plaintiffs still have strong incentives on this score, but unless
the effect of a large tort recovery has no influence upon behavior, then
these incentives must be dulled by the new prospect of some tort re-
covery for bad outcomes against a product manufacturer. The retro-
65 See generally Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985) (discussing the
issue of remote risk in the context of toxic torts and suggesting that relief should not be
through private law suits).
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active change in liability rules will do nothing to decrease the level of
accident and disease. If anything, it will increase them slightly.
The key effects, however, are likely to be redistributive. With
respect to future changes in liability rules, the question was whether
there was an implicit redistribution within the class of workers or
consumers, be it from rich to poor or the other way around. With
retroactive changes, all those workers or consumers stand to gain
from the new law. It is also possible-especially for those who think
themselves likely to be harmed, such as persons who work with old
capital equipment or who have been exposed to asbestos-that the
value of any new cause of action far exceeds whatever private loss
they suffer from any prospective limitation upon freedom of contract.
Given this situation, they in turn will be prepared to invest re-
sources-rent seeking again-to preserve the current legal status quo
against attack. It is not surprising, therefore, that unions have gener-
ally been strong opponents of any form of product liability legislation.
In this venture, they also have very powerful allies and oppo-
nents. The lawyers for the plaintiffs' bar stand to make a fortune on
the new legal rules, retroactively applied. They can be counted upon
as champions of the new status quo ante. Lawyers on the defendants'
side have a similar position. If all these retroactive claims were re-
moved, then the business of defending clients on the merits of individ-
ual cases would no longer be of any consequence. The income of good
defense lawyers is their ability to win cases on their merits-risk/util-
ity and unreasonable assumption of the risk. Their workload and in-
come are cut way down by a set of liability rules that make huge
classes of cases irrelevant. The legal profession may desire some
change, but never a return to the earlier regime of limited product
liability.
The forces for reform are also powerful, for if the new retroactive
liabilities create huge inchoate benefits, they impose huge inchoate
losses. Here, the individual firms that are burdened with these liabili-
ties will try to escape them. In part, they will challenge the legal rules
by reform proposals; in part, they may engage in corporate restructur-
ing; and in part, they will seek to fasten as large a share of these new
and unwelcome liabilities upon the insurance carriers, who had un-
derwritten all or part of their product liability risk. In this venture,
some manufacturers have proved, in general, startlingly effective. In
the asbestos area, for example, the producers are allowed to exhaust
the benefit of any policy in effect during the period between first expo-
sure and first manifestation, so that a day's worth of premiums can in
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effect be made to answer for years of prior exposure.66 The web of
influence becomes ever broader, and the consequences ever more
uncertain.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The battle over legislative reform has been influenced both by the
structural issues of tort reform and by the politics of redistribution.
Each element has its own role to play, and what follows is but a short
account of why it is that only ineffective reform proposals have been
made, and why these have failed and are likely to continue to fail.
The first set of observations have to do with the substance of the
proposed reforms. In general, the reform faction has tried several
lines of approach. In some instances, they propose elaborate proce-
dural rules. One such system allows the parties to opt out of the tort
system upon the willingness to pay (or take) a sum equal to the eco-
nomic losses of the plaintiff (usually defined as medical expenses and
lost earnings, minus collateral payments) plus some limited amount
for dignitary losses, including pain and suffering.6 7 In addition, some
statutes speak to the coordination of workers' compensation with tort
liability, or to the creation of a special statute of repose, or to limita-
tions on joint and several liability for noneconomic damages in torts,
or, on some occasions, to the modification of the legal rules that apply
to design and warning cases or to affirmative defenses.
What is characteristic about the full range of reforms is that none
66 See Keene v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982). Note that the insurance industry won other cases, including Eagle-Picher
Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1028 (1983), but the insureds have the power to direct litigation into the D.C. Circuit and
other jurisdictions that adopted a similar view, so that in all future industry-wide settlement
cases, Keene became the norm. I have commented on the contract arguments raised in these
coverage cases in Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 475 (1984). An approach more sympathetic to the Keene decision is found in
Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 739 (1984).
67 For a scheme of this sort, see S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201,06, 132 Cong. Rec. 31
(1986). Note that the system is potentially very tricky to operate, and its consequences are
very hard to follow. Thus, each side has to compare its chances when it opts for the "expe-
dited" settlement against those which it faces when it has to litigate under the ordinary rules of
product liability. Generally, we should expect a side to propose this option only where it
thinks that its expected costs are lower than under the tort system, and for it to be accepted
where the other side makes its own similar calculation. If that is the case, then it appears that
the conditions for this second tier will be satisfied only when the normal conditions for settle-
ment are satisfied, at which point there is little change. But the rules are sufficiently complex
that no one can be sure that the first approximation is the final outcome, which is one reason
why legislatures should be rightly concerned about the creation of a new system of settlement
in an area of litigation which itself is so highly charged.
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of them tries to undo any of the major structural reforms that are
found in product liability law. No one is willing to pass legislation
that would allow disclaimers of liability, or even limitations upon lia-
bility subject to some legislative minimums. Contractual freedom is
dead in this area, as is too often the case elsewhere. There is no effort
to return to a theory of implied misrepresentations as the sole defini-
tion of product defect. There is no effort to undo the risk/utility anal-
ysis, but only to constrain it, perhaps by a negligence instead of a
strict liability standard, or by insistence that plaintiffs demonstrate
with some particularity the technical and economic efficacy of alterna-
tive designs.
In one sense, the range of proposals is quite remarkable, because
even if they were all instantly enacted, the scope of tort liability still
would be far greater today than it was at the publication of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts in 1965. The present reform movement
may be regarded as conservative when judged against the baseline of
current state common law doctrine. But in its effort to tame the pres-
ent set of current tort doctrines, it implicitly ratifies extensions of tort
liability that would have been dismissed as inconceivable in the 1950s.
The question is: Why should this come to pass? In part, I think it
is because there is a widespread social consensus that contractual ar-
guments founder on perceived (if erroneous) difficulties with inequal-
ity of bargaining power and imperfect information. The law of
product liability is difficult to understand, and the economic ratio-
nales for certain contracting practices are not fully understood even
by the proponents of reform themselves. In addition, the contract so-
lutions, however desirable in principle, would not work for the full
backlog of products already in the marketplace, but which have yet to
cause actionable injury. The proponents of reform are worried about
products in the marketplace as well as future innovation. Established
firms with many products in the field will have a relatively greater
concern with the former than with the latter. Unlike new, possibly
unformed, firms, they will want a set of reforms that is responsive to
that set of cases. Given the dual concern with past and future, many
firms will find it difficult to "cash out" the impact of legislative change
to them, let alone to overall levels of accidents and prevention. While
anecdotal evidence is easy to come by, accurate statistical data is
harder to accumulate, even if there are a number of careful empirical
studies that speak to smaller questions of product liability law.68
68 See, e.g., Dewees, Economic Incentives for Controlling Industrial Disease: The Asbestos
Case, 15 J. Legal Stud. 289 (1986); Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product
Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1986).
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For their part, legislatures, unlike courts, always have the option
to do nothing at all. The huge range of problems that have to be
tackled as part of a single reform slows down the movement for legis-
lative action both inside the private firms and the legislature. I do not
wish here to discuss the interest group politics that frustrates legisla-
tive change at both the state and federal level.69 Suffice it to say that
the size of the stakes are sufficiently large that the problem will not go
away and will not be solved.
I close by noting the ironic course of the products liability
revolution. In its inception, the major doctrinal innovations came by
judicial decision, each of which seemed-to its advocates at least-
modest enough when taken alone. But the whole is often far greater
than the sum of its parts. The cumulative effect of these incremental
parts has produced a system of judicial regulation which rivals, if it
does not exceed, the systems of direct administration for product reg-
ulation. Now that the system is in place, it has taken on a life of its
own. To undo the system by legislation is a daunting task, even in the
absence of political conflict and struggle, for it requires a keen appre-
ciation of which features of the older common law regime were criti-
cal to its success, and which had, at best, marginal importance. The
constant focus on strict liability, as opposed to the definition of prod-
uct defect, is evidence of how easy it is to misdiagnose the current
situation. Yet even if these intellectual barriers could be overcome,
the political obstacles seem well-nigh. insuperable. While the modern
changes were introduced without the slightest empirical investigation,
precise data is now routinely demanded as a precondition to any sub-
stantive change in legal rules. The upshot is that we are now locked
into the status quo unless and until the judges decide to reverse field
and to moderate some of the rigors of product liability law. I believe
that some changes in this direction will come, but my own fears are
that the changes on this front will also be too little and too late. All
those who think that common law experiments can be reversed by
legislation should think again.
69 For a brief account, see Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78
Am. Econ. Rev. 311 (1988).
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